Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
- 1 August 1992
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 57 (2) , 278-305
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90037-i
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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