Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
- 1 October 1991
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 8 (4) , 341-354
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00183045
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 19 references indexed in Scilit:
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