Credulity, lies, and costly talk
Top Cited Papers
- 1 May 2007
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 134 (1) , 93-116
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.003
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
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