The effectiveness of the carrot and the stick in increasing dyadic outcomes during duopolistic bargaining
- 1 January 1984
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Behavioral Science
- Vol. 29 (1) , 1-12
- https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830290102
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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