Sick of Being Unemployed? Interactions Between Unemployment and Sickness Insurance in Sweden
Preprint
- 1 January 2002
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper examines the incentive effects caused by the interactions between unemployment insurance (UI) and sickness insurance (SI), two important components oKeywords
All Related Versions
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