Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
- 1 October 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 28 (1) , 79-99
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(02)00107-0
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