Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games
Open Access
- 1 March 2000
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 2 (3) , 227-238
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01669197
Abstract
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