Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliated Private Values
Preprint
- 1 January 2003
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an increasing equilibrium in the two player k-double auction with affiliated private values. In the case kKeywords
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