Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
- 1 October 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 55 (1) , 17-40
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90057-b
Abstract
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This publication has 30 references indexed in Scilit:
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