Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Partnerships under Uncertainty: An Overview
- 1 November 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 25 (2) , 311-336
- https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0675
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