Collective Action and Protection
Preprint
- 1 January 2000
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Empirically collusive industries are known to be highly effective lobbyists. The reasons for this unclear and poorly understood. This paper provides a new explaKeywords
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