Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts
- 1 March 1997
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 91 (1) , 28-44
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2952257
Abstract
Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts - Volume 91 Issue 1 - Jeffrey A. SegalKeywords
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