Explaining Government Productivity
- 1 October 1998
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Politics Quarterly
- Vol. 26 (4) , 439-458
- https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x9802600403
Abstract
This article revises our understanding of the conditions under which the federal government produces important legislation. I reevaluate and only mildly vindicate Mayhew's findings about the effect public opinion has on the productivity of the federal government. By revealing the size of the nation's debt to be an important determinant of productivity, however, I suggest that Mayhew's work overlooked the relationship between fiscal conditions and policy output. I also examine empirically the claims of Krehbiel's theoretical work about gridlock.Keywords
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