Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data
- 1 September 2000
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 94 (3) , 595-609
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2585833
Abstract
Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data - Volume 94 Issue 3 - Robert S. Erikson, Thomas R. PalfreyKeywords
All Related Versions
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