Coalition formation as a dynamic process
- 1 May 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 110 (1) , 1-41
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00004-8
Abstract
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This publication has 31 references indexed in Scilit:
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