Determinants of protectionist attitudes in the united states house of representatives
- 1 March 1991
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International Trade Journal
- Vol. 5 (3) , 301-328
- https://doi.org/10.1080/08853909108523718
Abstract
Constituency pressures are often credited with explaining the votes of individual members of Congress on trade legislation. Such pressures could even lead to the formation of a protectionist coalition among members of Congress as a result of vote trading among the members seeking to represent constituency interests. An analysis of seven votes in the House of Representatives in 1983 and 1984, however, provides little evidence that such constituency pressures were effective and virtually no evidence that any large protectionist coalition was forming at this time. The party affiliation of the members, however, was important to their voting patterns.Keywords
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