The role of institutions in reputation models of sovereign debt
- 28 February 1995
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 35 (1) , 45-64
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(94)01165-7
Abstract
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This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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