Underpricing in Discriminatory and Uniform-Price Treasury Auctions
Preprint
- 1 January 2003
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper compares the new uniform-price U.S. Treasury auctions to the traditional discriminatory mechanism and examines the extent to which the auction mechanKeywords
All Related Versions
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