Collusion in Uniform-Price Auctions: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Treasury Auctions
- 1 July 1996
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 9 (3) , 757-785
- https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/9.3.757
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
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