Trigger-Response Transitions in Foreign Policy Crises, 1929-1985

Publisher Website
Google Scholar
Abstract
This article focuses on the behavior-begets-behavior dynamic in the context of the interactions of states in crisis. Matching behavior is defined as a reciprocal relationship between incoming behavior (crisis trigger) and outgoing behavior (crisis response). A model of matching or reciprocal behavior is proposed, and several factors — threat to basic values, sociopolitical conditions, and power relations among crisis actors — are examined from the perspective of their potential disruption of the matching process. An initial finding is that crises, like the much more heavily studied conflict processes in general, exhibit a very high degree of matching behavior. However, there is considerable evidence that the factors examined here contribute to the disruption of these processes. A low threat to decision makers' values provides a context in which decision makers may respond with violence to nonviolent crisis triggers. Similarly, deteriorating sociopolitical conditions in countries experiencing a foreign policy crisis contribute to a higher than expected level of violence in crisis behavior. Finally, power parity among crisis actors was found to contribute to disruptions in matching behavior.

This publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit: