The uncovered set in spatial voting games
- 1 September 1987
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 23 (2) , 129-155
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00126302
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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