PROMISE KEEPING IN THE GREAT SOCIETY: A MODEL OF CREDIT INFORMATION SHARING
- 1 July 1992
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 4 (2) , 117-136
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1992.tb00058.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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