Developing the Idea of Intentionality: Children's Theories of Mind
- 1 March 1990
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 20 (1) , 89-113
- https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1990.10717210
Abstract
At least since Augustine, philosophers have constructed developmental just-so stories about the origins of certain concepts. In these just-so stories, philosophers tell us how children must develop these concepts. However, philosophers have by and large neglected the empirical data about how children actually do develop their ideas about the world. At best they have used information about children in an anecdotal and unsystematic, though often illuminating, way (see, for example, Matthews, 1980).Keywords
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