An “Events” Approach to the Problem of Cabinet Stability
- 1 July 1984
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 17 (2) , 167-197
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414084017002003
Abstract
This article seeks to develop the argument that existing theoretical work investigating cabinet stability in parliamentary democracies is in need of reorientation. In the first part, we offer an extended critique of historical and contemporary literature, focusing heavily on contributions from coalition theory and recent empirical research on situational determinants of cabinet longevity. Arguing that the various models associated with both these research traditions are likely to be misspecified, in the second section we offer the sketch of a preliminary model of cabinet stability based upon “events” arising in the political environment of cabinet actors and capable of bringing on the termination of their governments. Unlike earlier theoretical treatments, our “events” focus suggests that a major component of a successful model of cabinet stability should be stochastic. In the final section, we seek to demonstrate the versatility and efficacy of an “events” approach to cabinet stability by providing a research agenda for further investigation of the problem. Two such projects are described: one pertaining to inductively oriented work relating “events” to the dissolution of cabinets, and the other a discussion of the consequences of an “events” approach for the deductive modelling of cabinet formation and persistance over time.Keywords
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