Debt and managerial rents in a real-options model of the firm
- 1 August 2008
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 89 (2) , 209-231
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.007
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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