Optimal monetary policy cooperation through state-independent contracts with targets
- 1 March 2000
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 44 (3) , 517-539
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00086-5
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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