Aristotle's Qualified Defense of Democracy through "Political Mixing"

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Abstract
What is Aristotle's final judgment on democracy? While some commentators take as dispositive his spirited criticisms of democracy, others emphasize the fact that Aristotle breaks company with the antidemocratic thrust of the Republic in arguing for the superior political judgment of the people. The theoretical foundation of this defense of democratic judgment, and the initial focus of this essay, is Aristotle's argument for collective superiority, which holds that a multiplicity of nonexperts can, when aggregated, surpass the political competence of the expert few (Politics III). Despite their differences regarding its merits, commentators unanimously view this argument as a simple unity. Against this, the author argues that there are two versions of collective superiority here that exist in a tension with each other: the first defense of democracy is ultimately defective, while the second aims at moderating the first. Only after recognizing its rhetorical dynamics can we appreciate the extent to which Aristotle's "defense" of democracy damns with faint praise. Exploring the reasons for his rhetorical approach enables us better to understand his view of the political implications of human nature, and therewith, the mix of hope and sobriety with which he views all efforts at political improvement. In this light, Aristotle emerges as neither "democratic" nor "antidemocratic," but--as he understands the term--"political." As such, his political science strikes a balance between, and thus offers us an alternative to, the modern dichotomy of Hobbesian pessimism and progressivist optimism.

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