Cash Compensation and Earnings' Components Around CEO Turnover: Does the Compensation Committee See Over the Horizon?
Preprint
- 1 January 2003
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Managers in their terminal years have an incentive to manipulate earnings to enhance earnings based bonuses. We examine this horizon problem by considering theKeywords
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