A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
- 1 April 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 27 (3) , 325-345
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(96)00776-8
Abstract
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This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
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