A group majority voting model of public good provision
- 1 June 1987
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 4 (2) , 117-131
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00450994
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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