Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences
- 1 January 1984
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 44 (3) , 397-410
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00119689
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
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