The Attractiveness of Political Markets: Implications for Firm Strategy
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- 1 April 2005
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Review
- Vol. 30 (2) , 397-413
- https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2005.16387895
Abstract
We conceptualize democracies as marketlike processes where demanders and suppliers of various public policies interact. Firms may enter political markets to seek new or to maintain existing policies that affect their current business operations or future opportunities. We contend that a firm's decision to become politically active is influenced, in part, by the attractiveness of the political market, and we outline conditions that make political markets more or less attractive for firms to compete in to advance their interests.Keywords
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