Effects of core properties in four-person games with side-payments
- 1 January 1979
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Behavioral Science
- Vol. 24 (4) , 263-280
- https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830240405
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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