An empirical examination of the relation between debt contracts and management incentives
- 1 April 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 27 (2) , 229-259
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(99)00006-3
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 39 references indexed in Scilit:
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