Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility
Top Cited Papers
- 1 October 2005
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 18 (5) , 561-584
- https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080500264180
Abstract
Philosophers working in the nascent field of ‘experimental philosophy’ have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from action theory to ethics to epistemology. In this paper we present the results of our attempts to apply this approach to the free will debate, in which philosophers on opposing sides claim that their view best accounts for and accords with folk intuitions. After discussing the motivation for such research, we describe our methodology of surveying people's prephilosophical judgments about the freedom and responsibility of agents in deterministic scenarios. In two studies, we found that a majority of participants judged that such agents act of their own free will and are morally responsible for their actions. We then discuss the philosophical implications of our results as well as various difficulties inherent in such research.Keywords
This publication has 27 references indexed in Scilit:
- Skill, luck, control, and intentional actionPhilosophical Psychology, 2005
- The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and StartsMind & Language, 2004
- The Butler problem revisitedAnalysis, 2004
- Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigationPhilosophical Psychology, 2003
- Intentional action: Controversies, data, and core hypothesesPhilosophical Psychology, 2003
- Limits on theory of mind use in adultsCognition, 2003
- Jackson's Empirical Assumptions*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2001
- Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and IndeterminismThe Journal of Philosophy, 1999
- Reply to Christopher HillAnalysis, 1992
- Alternate Possibilities and Moral ResponsibilityThe Journal of Philosophy, 1969