Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
- 1 March 1999
- journal article
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 67 (2) , 393-412
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00024
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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