Discrimination and open unemployment in a segmented labour market
- 1 January 1995
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 39 (1) , 1-15
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(94)00012-o
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
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