Corporate Cash Reserves and Acquisitions
- 17 December 1999
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 54 (6) , 1969-1997
- https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00179
Abstract
Cash‐rich firms are more likely than other firms to attempt acquisitions. Stock return evidence shows that acquisitions by cash‐rich firms are value decreasing. Cash‐rich bidders destroy seven cents in value for every excess dollar of cash reserves held. Cash‐rich firms are more likely to make diversifying acquisitions and their targets are less likely to attract other bidders. Consistent with the stock return evidence, mergers in which the bidder is cash‐rich are followed by abnormal declines in operating performance. Overall, the evidence supports the agency costs of free cash flow explanation for acquisitions by cash‐rich firms.This publication has 36 references indexed in Scilit:
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