Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games
- 1 September 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 88 (1) , 188-230
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2555
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
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