Agency research in managerial accounting: A second look
- 1 January 1990
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Accounting, Organizations and Society
- Vol. 15 (4) , 341-371
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(90)90023-n
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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