Optimal employment contracts and the returns to monitoring in a principal‐agent context
- 1 March 1990
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 6 (2) , 761-799
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.1990.tb00785.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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