Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system
- 1 May 2008
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 63 (1) , 203-226
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.009
Abstract
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