Gambling for global goods
- 19 February 2008
- journal article
- editorial
- Published by Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 105 (7) , 2261-2262
- https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0800033105
Abstract
The human species has the sad capacity to destroy the climate of this planet. Many of our current behaviors and policies are almost ideally geared to meet this “goal” as quickly as possible. The per capita CO2 emission of the United States is approximately twice that of the United Kingdom or Japan and three times that of France or Sweden. Why is this the case? Preserving the global climate is the biggest public goods game ever. It is a game that concerns all of us, and we cannot afford to lose it. Once the global climate is destroyed, not even enormous stock market gains could make us happy anymore. In a simple and elegant experiment, Milinski, Marotzke, and colleagues (1) have examined the ability of people to solve what they call a “collective risk social dilemma.” To play Milinski's game, you need six players and some money. Initially, all players receive 40 euros in their private accounts. The game has 10 rounds. In each round, players can transfer 0, 2, or 4 euros into a “climate account.” At the end of the game, the climate account must contain at least 120 euros. In this case, the climate has been saved and each player receives whatever is left in his private account. If the climate account does not reach its target, then the climate is lost with a 90% chance. In this case, all players loose all of their money. Thus, in every round, players must choose one of three options: invest 0, 2, or 4 euros into the climate account. Milinski et al. …Keywords
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