Final decisions, the Nash equilibrium and solvability in games with common knowledge of logical abilities
- 31 December 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 22 (3) , 229-255
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(91)90024-l
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:
- A theory of rational decision in gamesErkenntnis, 1987
- The conventionally stable sets in noncooperative games with limited observations I: Definitions and introductory argumentsMathematical Social Sciences, 1987
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete informationInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1985
- Rationalizable Strategic BehaviorEconometrica, 1984
- On the Status of the Nash Type of Noncooperative Equilibrium in Economic TheoryThe Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1982
- Agreeing to DisagreeThe Annals of Statistics, 1976
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the GameManagement Science, 1968
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium PointsManagement Science, 1968
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic ModelManagement Science, 1967
- Almost Strictly Competitive GamesJournal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 1961