Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable
- 1 April 1990
- journal article
- Published by Project MUSE in World Politics
- Vol. 42 (3) , 336-369
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2010415
Abstract
Empirical analyses of deterrence have paid insufficient attention to the validity and reliability of the data used to test the central propositions of theories of deterrence. This article examines two prominent studies of immediate extended deterrence that do not deal adequately with the problems inherent in constructing a valid data set for quantitative analysis. The problems are particularly acute in the testing of theories of deterrence because of the difficulties in identifying cases of deterrence success and of inferring the intentions of would-be challengers. Our analysis explores these problems and suggests ways of testing theories of deterrence that can reduce the threats to valid inference.Keywords
This publication has 17 references indexed in Scilit:
- Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of WarAmerican Political Science Review, 1988
- Deterrence Failure and Crisis EscalationInternational Studies Quarterly, 1988
- Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952Journal of American History, 1985
- What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980World Politics, 1984
- From Cold War to Cold War in the Near EastReviews in American History, 1981
- Soviet-American Politics and the Turkish StraitsPolitical Science Quarterly, 1977
- More calculations about deterrenceJournal of Conflict Resolution, 1965
- The calculus of deterrenceJournal of Conflict Resolution, 1963
- Current Communist Tactics in IndonesiaAsian Survey, 1961
- General Nasution's Mission to MoscowAsian Survey, 1961