Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
- 1 November 2005
- journal article
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 73 (6) , 1893-1937
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00641.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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