Collusion and predation under (almost) free entry
- 31 December 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 7 (3) , 381-401
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(89)90005-2
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
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