Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Bank Bailout Policy
Preprint
- 1 January 2005
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
As the number of bank failures increases, the set of assets available for acquisition by the surviving banks enlarges but the total amount of available liquiditKeywords
All Related Versions
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