Psychological games and sequential rationality
- 1 March 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 1 (1) , 60-79
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90005-5
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
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