Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports
- 18 March 2004
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 52 (1) , 165-177
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00220.x
Abstract
This paper shows that under reasonable conditions, increasing gate revenue sharing among teams in a sports league will produce a more uneven contest, i.e. reduce competitive balance. This result has significant implications for antitrust authorities and legislators, who have tended to assume that revenue sharing arrangements will necessarily promote competitive balance.Keywords
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